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The pa  per  exanines  the  phenomenon  of  'rFed Watching"  within  the  context  of  a
nacroecononic policy  game.  Unllke  prevlous  policy  gane models,  j.ndlvlduals
are  allowed  to  acquire  information  about noneNary growth  in  addloion  to  lhe
hlstorical  data.  Agentrs  declslons  ape based on the  oppontunity  coBgs of
resources  expended !o  augnent  theirl  lnformatlon  set.  Incorporated  into  lhe -Cuikerman 
and Meltzer  model of  asymmegplc  lnforma|ion,  lhe  public's
optimlzlng  behavior  nakes Nhe  agenlrs  informatlon  set  a sUra0egic varlabLe.
In  bhis  settlng,  it  ls  shown  that  individuals  strategic  behavior  can
inftuence  lhe  moneiary  authoriLyts  strategy  with  respect  Uo nonelar"y  gnovrih
-  conLrol.  Flrt,her,  the  policymaker  strabeglcally  chooses the  conlrol
varialtce  of  money Srowt,h to  lnfLuence  agentrs  i nformal lon-see kj.ng behavior.
Keywords:  endogenous  informalion,  asynmeiric  infornatlon,  time
lnconsistency,  credj.blligy  r  policy  games,Sectlon  1:  Introduct i on
The tine  consistency  problen  involves  the  publlc  forming  expectations
of  noney growth prior  to  Lhe monetary authorityts  implementation  of  policy,
Even though agenLs form expectations  rationalty,  1.e.  use al]-  avallable
lnfornation,  lhe  lack  of  pre-commi  tment  on  the  part  of  lhe  policymaker
allows  eurprise  money  growth to  be possible.  Kydland anO Prescott  (1977)
first  descnibed  bhe natu.r"e of  this  policy  game and nunerous  auLhors  have
extended their  analysis.  The prinary  difference  in  lhese  exlensions  of
Kydland and PrescotL  is  the  Creatment of  agents'  informatlon  sets.  In  Barro
and Cordon (1983),  agents  k:row  the  prefenences of  the  policymaker,  while  in
Rogoff  (1985),  agents  know policymaker  preferences,  but  do not  obseFve.  the
productiviEy  shocks  llIlt j.l  after  expectalions  have  been set.  Several  authops
have examined models of  as  ymmetrL  c,.lnfornai ion .  In  Canzoneri  (1985),  agents
do not  know t.he rnoneLary authorityrs  forecast  of  money demand shockg.  In
Backus  and Driff j.11 (1985), Barro (1986), and Cukierman  and Meltzer  (1986),
agents  do not  lfioH  the  pneferences  of  the  monelany authorlty,  so  they  nust
use  past  observatlons  of  money growth  to  infer  policymaker  preferences.  In
all  of  these  papers,  the  pubLic's  rational  forecast  is  based on
predetenrnined  ,  flxed  informali.on  set.
This  pa  per  considers  an exiension  t,o t,he typicaL  macroeconomic  policy
game  by a1loH  j.n  g..a  gents to  rraugment,rr  their  information  set.  ThaC  ls,  allou
the  lnfornalj.on  set  to  be a choi.ce vaniable.  Darby  (1926) anaLyzed the
opLirnaL  choice  of  cost,ly  inforrnation  in  a general  contex!.  Here we
allow  agents  to  expend resources  to  acquire  j.nforna.tion lrhich  lmprove Lhelr
forecasts  of  noney growth.  We are  attempting  t,o captu.re  the  phenomenon
ofLen described  as  "Fed Watchlng" uhere agents  expend resources  to  Salnlnslght  into  Lhe actj.ons of  the  monetary authorlty.  The model of  Cukierman
and Meltzer  (hereafter  C-M) provides  a fr arnewor  k which  is  easlly  nodlfled  go
analyze  the  effects  of  Fed waLchlng,
The paper  j.s organized  as  follows,  SecLion  2  introduces  the  notion  of
augnented lnfornation  sets  into  a simp.le static  franewor  k.  The staLlc
version  j.s characlerized  by preference  shocks that  are  serially
uncorrelated.  Represenling  the  policy  game  in  thls  mannef highltghfs  Lhe
agentrs  allbcation  probtem.  Section  3 considers  the  agentrs  choice of  the
optimal  lnfornation  set, in  lhe  Cuklernan and Meltzer  asymmetric infornation
nodel.  With  serlally  correlated  poltcymaker  preferences  and positive
nonetary  contnol  variance,  agents mus! declde  how to  weight  past
observatlons  and currenl  infonnation  purchases  lrhen forning  expectatj.ons.
Seclion  4 examines how  agentsr  optimal  choice  of  a forecasi  error  variance
reacts  to  changes ln  monetary conlro]-  vaniance;  and how the  mone|ary
aut'horityrs  opclmal- control  vafiance  reacts  to  changes in  the  publicrs
fonecasL error  variance.
Section  2:  Serlally  UncorreLaLed Preferences
In  fonmulating  po]lcy,  lhe  monetary aut,hoFity  ls  viewed as being
subJect t,o vanious  political  and social  forces.  The impact,  of  these forces
Ls nanifesLed  as..changes  in  policymaker  tr  pn  eferences .  rt trPreferencesrr  refer
to  the  weight  pollcymakers  ptace on stinuLatlng  economlc acLlvl!y  vepsus
cont,rolling  j.nflatlon.  The monetary authonity  possegses  exclusj.ve
infornaclon  abouL lhe  true  value  of  the  weighling  p-arameter.  The presence
of  aaymmetnlc lnformation  increases  the  incent,j.ve  of  the  pollcymaker  to
avoid  pre-comni  tnen  t, to  a rate  of  monetany  growth.f ^tr  6  .16c^Fi  hi  --  +r .-,..6  ,he  objective  functiong  of  lhe  monelary authorj.ty  and
(a representauive  agen0 of)  the  public,  we need to  outline  the  structure  of
the  policy  game  and make  the  sequence  of  events  explicit.  First,  a
policymaker  preference  shock occurs.  The exact  nature  of  this  shock is  the
private  informatlon  of  lhe  monetary authority.  The public  forecast,s  lhls
preference  shock;  the  rrqualigyn of  thls  forecas!  depends  on lhe  level  of
resources  devoted to  trnoniuorlng  the  monetary authority.2  Based  on an
infornatj.on  set  t'augmenled"  by  Fed watching,  the  public  t.hen forns
expec0ations  of  the  preference  shock  and future  money gFol,Jth.  Finally,  the
pollcylaker  chooses the rate  or  money  growth  taking  agentrs  expecLatlons as
gi ven .
The policymaker's  objective  is  to
(1)  max  r  g1 [[m -  E(n  lr  )t  n  -  (^  \2r
i 
-\,,,it,i./J  ^i  ,*.r,2],
!,,here  n-  denoies rnoney  gFowth, E(rn.lI.)  is  the D hl iois. fnpanzsf ^f  m
r  "'  t'  t
Biven the  informat,ion  seL Ir,  and g denotes the  rate  of  discoun!.  The
variable  x.  refrects  the  poricymakerts  preferences  for  stimulacing  economlc
aclivlty  through  surprise  noney growth relative  t,o control-llng  inflation.
As x1 increases,  t,he policymaker  is  willing  to  bear a higher  rate  lnflat,ion
in  order  t,o further  stlmulate  economic  aetivity.  Because  we assune that
preferences  are  no!  serial-Iy  correlated,  the  monetary authoriby  takes  the
pubLicts  current* and future  forecasts  of  money  growth as  glven.  Since
future  expectations  are  j.ndependen!  of  lhe  rnonet,ary  authorit,y's  currenl
acLlon,  the  monetary authorityts  maximization  problem can be reduced Lo the
one peniod maxlmizacion problem described  by
(1a) rnax  [rni  - n(mrlrr)Jx,  -  (rr)2zzEquations  (l)  and  (1a)  irnpry Lhat  non-zero noney growth has a negative
impact on the  nonetapy aulhorityrs  ut,ility,  but  that  surprise  money  growlh
has a positive  lmpacL.
It  is  assurned  that  x-  is  random and  is  descrj.bed  by
(2)  xt  = A + v..
Policymaker preferences  are  on average A, and the  vaniable  v.  is
independently  and identically  distributed  with  mean zero and uu"i"n""  o3,3
Maximizing  (1a) wit,h respecN to  mi  yields
(3)  m  = x  = A + v., '-i  "i  -' 
i
Accordlng  to  equation  (3),  gfre selection  of  the  rate  of  money  gpowth depends
dipect,ly  upon the  reLaLive  imporlance of  sLimulatlng  economic activity
versus cFeating  additional  j.nflation.  Note that  in  lhe  absence  of  any
public  information  abou!  v.  the  expected money  growth rate  is  e  qual Lo A.
In  a standard  ti.ne consistency  node],  the  public  sets  expectations
glven  an  lnforrnalion  set  tha!  includes  a  conjecture  of  poi-icymaker
preferences,  Hor.rever,  we allow  agenLs to  augnent  their  informacion  set  by
expending  resources.  Thls  permits  the  public  to  get  an  idea  of  what  t.he
pol icymaker rs  contemporaneous preference  shock  is.  The pub.lic  chooses  tne
level  of  regources  !o  expend in  an attempL to  ninj.mize unanticipated  on
trsurprisen  money-"creaL  j.  on  .  For lhe  sake of  sj.mpllcily,  we assume  that  t,he
public  conslsts  of  a se!  of  identicaL  indj.viduals.  Consequently,  the
publlcrs  problem nay be CreaLed fron  lhe  perspective  of  a repnesenLative
4 agenE.
Pormal]y,  the  repregencallve  agentrs  behavj.or 1s characuerized  asmax  ^t t  t-  ,  2,-,t?  ^,  2,
\e/  ^-  r,l(mJ -  ELm.lr=(o_)-1,  I  -  c(0-,J. I  -  I  1'  I  e  -  e
o"
)
I.(o-)  represents  the  informat,ion  set  fron  hrhi  ch  agenLs  form  their
6
expeccatj.ong.-  This  information  set  consists  of  knowledge  of  the  general
motivation  of  the  monetary  authorily  (i.e.  knowledge  of  the  functiona]  form
of  lhe  monetary  authority's  maximizaLion  problen  and  that  m-  =  xi),
knowledge  of  the distrlbuti.on  of  nonetany  authorityrs  O""rui"n"""  (1.e.  x,  =
A + vr,  E(v.) = 0, and  Var(v,) = o1l  , and  an esLinaLe  of the contempopaneoug
I  I  i  v"
pollcymaker  preference  shocX, vf.  This  estimate  has the  following
I
properties  I
rtv, - vlJ  =  o, E[(vi  - ,lt1  = 
"f,,
niv!(v,  - 
"?)l 
=  e, e[vr(vi  - u!il = o!, 'no
E[v.(v. - rilt  = 0 for i  * i.
Thus, the publlcrs  estimale of
2 varlance oI  0e.
The publ j.c can  impFove its  estimate  of  the  pneference  shock  by
expending resources  on infornaLj.on  acquisition.  C(o^2)  is  the  anoun! of
resources  expended  to  get  a forecasE  of  Lhe policymaker'g  preference  shock
2?2
of  quality  o-.  The properties  of  o-  are:  C, < 0,  Cu > 0,  C(ol)  = 0,  and
C(0)  = -,  The nore  resources  devoted to  uncovening ghe monetary authority,s
preferences  t,tle-  betten  is  the  publlcrs  estimate  of  the  preference  shock,
2
i.e.'  lower  o-.  If  no resources  are  expended  then  agents  wilt  have no
lnformation  about  the  contemporaneous preference  shock  aslde  from  l()owledge
of  its  distribution,  t.".,  oj  =  t1.  Thls 1s the sLandard  assunplion of
all  of  the  oihen  asymmetrlc informatlon  macropolicy  games.  However, in  our
model agents  can lmprove t,hetn eslinale  of  the  preference  shock by
the  preference  shock  is  unbiased  and has aincreasing  the  amount resources  devoted  to  moniioning  Lhe nonetary
authorlly,  and if  an inflnlle  amount of  resources  are  expended  the  public
will  h:lot{  the  policymakerrs  true  preferences  with  certainty,
Given an estj.nale  of  the  pollcymakerts  preference  shock of  quality  of
and based on the  other  readily  available  inforrnallon,  expected money  growth
SubslltuLlng  (3) anO (l)  tnto  (4),  we find  Lhat Lhe public,s  problem  is  to
nax  .  2  2 (6) ';-  r - n[(vi  v])-l - c(oi) ],
oe
which  is  equivalent  to
max  .  2  ^,2, (oa,l 
2  t  -  oe -  u(oe,, J.
o^
The f j.rst, onder condl91on for  an j.nterior  solution  implies  that  the  optimal




(T)  C,(o_x) = _ t. e
From equation  (7)  anO the  second order  conditions,  1l  ls  obvlous  lhac
anything  lhau  increases  the  rnarginal  cost  of  monitoning  the  monetary
authority  (i.e-.,  make  C'(of)  rnore  negative on ac'(o!)zau  < o, where u Ee
denobes  an anbitrary  cost-increasing  parameLer  ) causes the  public  to  acquire
forecasts  Nhat are  Less accurate  {oj  nisn"").6
We  can evaluate  how the  publicis  ability  to  ionecasL  lhe  policynaker's
pneference shock changes ihe  policymaker's  expected uliliili.  From equaLiong(la),  (3),  and (5) we find  that  expected  utitity  of  the monetary  authority
i.s
E[(A  +  vi - a - ulltl , ur)2/z]  =  o! - 
"f;r, 
- ozrz.
Equation  (8)  suggests  that  a  better  forecast  of  pol icymaker  preferences
reaulbs  in  Lower expected utility  for  the  monetary authonity.  If  lhe  pubLic
has a clearer  picltre  of  the  objectives  of  the  monetary.authority,  then  it
1s much  mone  dlfficult  for  the  monetary authorit,y  to  generate surprise  rnoney
growth.  Consequentl-y, the  monetary authority  may have inceniive  to  naise
the  publicts  costs  of  obtaining  fopecasts  and as a result  increase  oj.  If,
as in  the  analysis  of  Barro  and Gordon (1983),  agents  have perfecL
i.nfornat  ion  about  the  preferences  of  the  monelary authority,  i.e.,  oi  = o,
expecLed  utility  is  -  oj  -  n?/2.  If,  as  in  the  C-M analysis,  agents have no





expected uLillty  is  a-/2  -  A-/?.  If  policymakers  followed  t,he money  growth
rule,  ti  = 0,  then  expected utility  is  zero.  Thus, when the  publlc  is
1e9s informed,  policynakers  are more likely  to  prefen  discretlonary  policy
than  to  be bound by a rule.
Section  3:  Serially  CorrelaLed  preferences  and ImperfecL Control
We now introduce  t,he coneept  of  augmenged infornation  inlo  lhe  C-M
model.  Thei.r model is  simil-ar  !o  the  one above excepL lhai  lhe  shocks to
t,he monetary aut.horiCy,s  preferences  are  serially  correlated.  Beeause
agents  canno! observe ihese  prefenences dire c  tl-y  ,. t,he  y use realizations  of
past noney growlh  t.o form expectatlons  of  the  rnonetary authoFityrs  curpenl
preferences.
(8)Policyrnakers har/e the  same  objective  as equation  ('l)  above, excepL
current  money  groHth rates  wilL  now afrect  future  expeccaLions.  However,
the  moneLary auLhorlty  has  imperfect,  control-  over  money growth.  AcLual
noney  growch  ls  glven  by
(9)  m. = ml + vi.
rnl is  planneo  money  growth and v1 is  a conlnol error.  Vi  is  i.i.d.  with
mean  zero and variance  oi.  Policymaker preferences  are  given  by
(10)  xr=1+pr,  A)0,
and
(11)  pt = ppi_1  +v.,0<p<1.
Llke  lhe  analysis  above, v.  is  i.i.d.  with  mean zero and variance  oi.
In  C-M,  the  infornallon  set  of  the  pub.lic  consi.sts  of  al-l  past
Pealizations  of  actual  money growth,  lalowLedge of  the  parane|er  A,  knowledge
of  the  distributions  of  v.  and Vi,  and a  consistent  coniecture  of  Lhe
noneLary aut,horityrs  planned money  groHth.  This  conjecture  is  given  by
(12)  mP=B^A+8p..
1  U  '1
Agenls know  B^,  A, and B,  but  do not  know p..7  Hene, we allow  the  publ  j.c to UI
augment  this  inforrnation  set  by allocating  resources  in  order  to  uncover the
monelary authdrityrs  preference  shock,  As a resul!,  agents  get  an esllnate,
e-e
vl ,  of  the  conLempopaneous  pFefenence shock v..  The properlies  of  vf  and r',
are  given  above.  The publ-ic can lmprove this  esti.mate,  i.e.,  lower  o^2,  by
corunlLt,ing  more pesources Lo monltoiing  the  monetary auLhoriLy.  Thus, the
public  when fonming their  expecbations  of  current  money  growth  knows  all
past, nealizatlons  of  aciual  money  growth,  and has esti.males of  current  andpasl  preference  shocks  along  with  loowledge  of  lhe  properties  of  these
estinales.  Notice  lhat, agents  are  uncertain  about  Lhe poll.c)4nakeris present
atrd pas!  preferences,  pi_j;  they nus!  lry  to  infen  the  preference  shocks
using  past  realizations  of  money groert,h and  current  and pas!  estimates  of
the  preference  shoc  ks .
FolLowlng C-Mrs anafysis,  we derlve  ihe  pubLic's  condi!1onal
expectatj.on of  money  growlh.  Fnom  equations  (9)  and (1.a), the  publicrs
conjeclure  of  actual  money growth  is
(13)  tl  =BOA+Bp.  +yr.
Glven the  publicrs  lnformation  set,  expected money  growLh is
(1lr)  rtn.lr.(oz.)l  =s  A+BEfnlm  e  e -0'-  - -'.i,-'1-1' ""  vi'  vl-t'  vi-r'  "'l'
,eee (  r),  uLPt  lmi_t  , ^i_2,  ...,  vi , ui_1  , ui_z  ,  ... ) =
(p-l)B^A - -Ea.^-i  - t# 
5lo 
^'*r-r-;  - 
,lo 
^'"i-3'
(16) ^=,++fi/z-  (1/4(+1  *  2-t)1./2,
(17) r = a2(o1ta1).
(The  derivalion  of  equati.ons  (15),  (16),  and (17) is  contained j.n the
Appendix).  Equatlon  (15)  is  vtrt.ua.l-Iy identical  to  t,hat in  C-M; however,
here the  public's  esElmates of  lhe  conlemporaneous  pneference shccks are
presenl  ln  the  forecasi  of  noney growih,  and  Lhe term  tr depends upon lhe
varj.ance of  the  public,s  preference  forecast 
"""o", 
oo2,  nol  upon the10
variance  of  the  prefenence shock o2-.  Implicib  1n lhe  analysls  above is  the
assunption  that  t,he ppoperties  of  Lhe current  and  past  forecasts  of  the
preference shocks are constant,  i.e,,  oi  -  o1 ,-.  (j  i  1).  This assumption '  e  e,r-J
Lurns  out, to  be consisient  with  maxinlzlng  behavlor  on  Lhe  part  of  the
public  and 1s shown  below.
Notlce  in  equalion  (15),  t,hat as the  publicrs  ',guess', of  lhe  ppeference
shock becones better  (i.e.,  a smaLler of)  ,oo"u  weight  iF  placed on Lhe
estimates  of  these shocks.  In  fac!, 
"" 
ol  + 0,  I  + p which causes agenls  to
place all.  weight  on ul_i,  i  = O,  ...,  co,  and no weight  on past  reatizations
of  money  growth.  0n the  other  hand, as  oi'0,  tr + O, which causes agenf,s
Y
to  place  al.l- the  wei.ght  on the  rnore recent  observation  of  past  money groh'th
and on the  esllmat,e of  the  curren!  preference  shock and no weighL on past
eslimates  of  the  preference  shock.
Proposition  ,1  .  The pubtic,s  conjecture  of  the  moneiary authorityrs  behavlor
(given  by equation  (13))  and lhe  publ-  j.crs expectaLj.ons of  money  growth
(descpibed by equation  (15))  are  consistent  wj.th a monet,ary  authority  whose
objective  is  to  maximize equafion  (1).  The paramelers of  the  agentls
^^niaatr:.a.FA
(18)  B^ = (1-8p)/(1-Br),
v
2
(  19)  B = (  1  -  B  p  - 
)  / (  1  -  B  p  r  )  .
(See appendlx for  proof. )
Thus, it,  is  national  for  agents  Lo have expeclations  of  noney growth giver|
by equation (15).  Equalions (18) airO  (19) imply thaL the publi.cts
expectatj.on  of  noney growth  in  our  nodel  depends on esLj.mates of  the
policymakerrs  preference  shocks.  Like  C-M, actions  of  Nhe morietapy11
authority  can only  affect  agentsr  expectations  thnough past  money  SrowLh
rates.  Because  the  publicrs  currenl  and fulure  estlmaLes of  contemporaneous
preference shocks (i.".,  u?*r,  j  = 0,  l,  ...,  n)  are  independent  of  actual
noney growth,  Che nonelary  authority's  choice  of  rnoney  growth  is  essentially
the  sane 1n our  nodel  as ln  C-M.  Notice  that  while  individual  preference
shock estimaies  (v!)  do not  affect  Ehe moneiany aut,honity,s  behavj.on, lhe
properties  of  these esLimates  (oil  Oo affect  equatlons  (18)  and  (19)  througn
the  par arnet,er  L
The degree to  which the  nonetary  authorily  "lnvesLs"  in  credj.bility  is
reflect,ed  by the  terms B0 and B.  Recal.l fron  section  2 that  if  the  ronetary
aulhority  does  not  lake  into  accouni  future  expectations  then  it  would  set,
planned money  growth equal  to  iLs  tradeoff  parameter,  i.e.  ml = x.,  When
the  policymaker  takes  into  account  future  expectations,  we l(rlow  t,hat  lhe
nonelary  authority's  planned money  growt,h  is  Iess  Chan its  tradeoff
pararneler since  BO  5  !  and B S 1.  The noneLary authority  restrains  itself
1n order  to  pregerve more favonable  noney growth expectations  in  lhe  future,
As o^- (o*-) falls  the  terms B^ and B rise  (fall)  (see Appendix).  As monetary EYU
control  j.mproves,  the  monet,any  authorityrs  conduct  of  pollcy  moves Cowards
a  lower  pLanned noney  growt,h and away frorn  i.ts  own tradeoff  parameter.
However, as  the  pubLlc's  estinales  of  policymaker's  preference  shocks
inprove,  planned  money growth  Lends No increase  towards  the  monetary
authonityrs  lradeoff  parameter.  when ol  f"ff=,  the  public  pays none
attention  to  its  own eslLmates of  the  preference  shocks and less  atlenlion
go past  money  Elowch when forming  expeclations  of  the  noneLary authority's
pnefepenceg.  TheFefone, the  monelary authority  has less  to  gain  frorn
invesLing  in  credibility  b€cause t,he pubLic  is  not  paytng as rnuch  altenLion
to  pasL noney SroHth.Gj.ven  the  expectations  mechanisn (equation  (15))  and aclual  noney
Srowuh  equallon  (equatlon  13)),  we can find  lhe  variance  of  the  publicts
noney groHth  forecast,  Thls  is  given  by
^2  2  ,  ..2  ?
-t t..  ,-  ,  2,.,2't  o  o"  (P-i/  oY  2 rzu.r L[(mi - ELInil]t(oe)l) I = 
(;^2) 
-ll]f  * 0v.
The  nore accurate the public,s  estlmace  of  the pneference  shock (Iower o2)
and the better  Lhe nonetary authorityrs  conlrol  {fower ofi) the better  1s the
publicrs  overall  fonecast of money  growth.
In  generaL, the public,s  expected  uliliLy  is  glven by
(21) -.E^  8i  E[  (mi  - Etnilri(  o3,r, o3,r-,,...)])21  * cto!,r)
i=0
)
when o:.  is  the  same  for  afl  tirne p€riods,  we can use equation  (A1  ) and the e'1
variance  of  the  publlc's  expected money  growth  given  by equa!1on (20)  tc
flnd  the  publicrs  expected discounted wel-fare for  a forecasi  of  preference
2
shocks of  quality  o-,  This  is
)2))
I  D  o"  (P-^/  oy  z  ^, z,
1-A  ?.  2.  -qr  "\-e/  '
:'  (  1-r-  )  (1-r-)
The constant, o^2  ,n.,  maxlmizes equation  (22) wiLt  saCisfy e
-  28(  d  B'ld  02)  02




.  2  2.  2.  -  2 Since B- + zn(dB/doJ) o;  > 0,an  inLerlor  solut,ion always exist  if  C'(oi)  =
o and  c'(o) = - -.8
Ihe  resulting  choice  of  o2 1s consLant across  lime  gj.ven equations
(15),  (18),  and (19).  The  monetary  authori.tyrs  behaviop  swnmarlzed  by13
equations (7),  (18),  and (19),  lhe  public's  expeclabions mechanlsln  gj.ven  by
eqraLion  (16),  and a  consLant,  optimal  oi  descrtUeO by equation  (23) are  all-
conglslenL  with  each other.  As ]ong as  the  stnuciural  parameters f,  8,  oj
remain  unchanged,  Lhe problem  facing  the  public  is  the  same in  each period
and, consequent.ly, the  choice of  o!  is  constanE over  Line.9
Secllon
Again,  it  is  obvious  from
t,he narginal  cost  of  obtaining
negative  )  will  cause  Lhe  public
effec0  of  the  control  var j.ance,
4:  Comparat.ive  Sta! l cs
equation (23) tha|  anything
preference  shock es  timates
to  choose  est,imat,es with  a
a  ,,  ^  1-
o.._.  on Ene cnolce  oI  o  Ls
YE
which ino"eases
2 (makes  C'  (  ol)  mone
2_
nl8ner  0e.  lne
also of  interest.
Proposlt,ion  2,  Let
))
d  oo-*  ,  a}
2 
'  -  +v  ' 
) dot  o!
?
o-x solve equation  (23).  A sufficient  condition for
< 1-Btp.
PFoposition  2 lndlcates  that  when t,he ratio  of  pneference estj.ma0e
variance to  control  variance 1s small  (reca]]  Nhat 0<  B < 1and0<B  <'l ),
Che public  wlll  desire  better  estimates  of  the  preference  shock for  higher
levels  of  conlroJ. variance.  This  inplies  that  as  the  monelary aulhorj.ty's
conlroL  gets  worse the  public  is  vJilling  to  expend more resourceg  t,o lmprove
lhe  quality  of Jheir  prefenence shock forecast.  This  allows  the  publlc  to
partially  offse!  the  increase  in  ihe  variance  of  thelr  noney grouth
estinates  caused by the  increase  in  lhe  control  variance.  The condition
given  1n ProposiLlon  2 1s a sufficj.en!  condigion;  .it  is  quite  possible  for
the  condi.tion  no!  to  hotd  and da?x/da? stilt  be negative.14
Like  the  example in  section  2 where prefenence shocks are  not  serially
conreLaged, the  ability  of  the  public  to  forn  estlnates  of  the  monelary
authority's  preference  shocks affects  the  monetary auLhorilyrs  expecled
ut,llity.  Recal-l that  the  expected utilit,y  of  the  monetany  authority  is
glven by
(24) Bi  (n,  - etnrlrr(o!l:l*,
Substj.tuting  equations  (13) and  (16)  inro  (25)  and taking  expectations
yi.eldg
|JCt
*.  2, z\  r-p )
l-  .  eol  n],o'
(2q)  |  --:- '--'L1-B  1-rp  2
- t^rlrtf
to




The betler  t,he publicrs  preference  forecasts  are  t,he lower  is  Lhe monetary
authorlly?s  expected utiliry,l0  Companing  equat,ion (45)  co the  measwe of
policymaker  utlllty  found  in  c-M, we see  (i)  o^t i"  in  the  first  term inslead
of  ol;  and (ii)  o"]  entens explicitly  in  the  policynakents utitity.  Once
VY
again,  lhe  ability  of  the  public  Eo augment  their  informaLion  seLs with
inforrnation  about  bhe nonet.ary  aut,horit,yts  pneference  shocks  makes it  mone
diff  icu.Lt for  discretionary  policy  to  yield  the  nonetany authority  greaten
utllity  than  the  f i.xed noney gnowt,h  rule  nl  = 0.11
C-M show that  i!  may be optimal  for  lhe  monetary  authority  to  tnve
positive  conerol  vaniance.  In our  model  ,  it  ls  less  likely  that  the
rnonefary aufhonily  wj.l1 choose a  positive  control  variance.  If  lhe  rDnet,ary
2?)
aut,hority chooses  0;  to maximize (25),  taking  o] as given,  ol  w1ll  satisfy Y-e-v
dB
-1  Z (zoJ  Oo... O  +
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i:rp
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(1-rp;215
Two elenents  presenL  in  our  analysis  r.Jor  k against  positive  control
12  2  2
varlance.. 
- 
First,  because oe-  < ov' lhe  f j.rsL Lwo  Nerms  j.n equatlon  (26)
are  smaller  in  our  analysis  than  ln  C-M.  Second,  the  presence  of  t,he fifth
tern  in  equation  (26),  which  1s not  pnesent in  C-M, represenis  the  dj.rect
negative  effect  of  the  controf  varlance.  The element  that  favors  the  choice
of  a  posMve  control  variance  is  that  with  a higher  control  variance  1L is
nore  difficult  for  the  public  to  ascertaln  the  policymaker's  true
preferences  by observing  past  money  growth rates.  However, thls  effect  is
weakened by Che fact  Chat  Che public  nol,, has  an alternaLive  information
source on which to  base it,s  expectation  of  policymaker  preferences.  Notice
)
that  lf  oe-  is  not  taken  as given,  t,hen according  to  propositton  3 j.t  wlL]  be
even nore  unlikely  !hat, the  optimal  conLrol. variance  is  positive.
Proposibion  3.  Let o2* sarisfy equaLion  (26), tnen ool*tOo!,  O.
This  is  an lnt,eresti.ng result.  It  i.s similan  lo  proposition  6 in  C-M, but
1C has a somewhat  differenL  intuj.t,ive  interpretation.  proposillon  4 implies
ghat, as  the  public  has  a  b€tter  forecast  of  the  monet,ary aut,horit,yrs
preference  shocks,  the  monelary authorily  will  want to  improve rnonetary
conbrol ,  Thj.g seems  counterlntuMve  at  f irst,  glance,  because one lrouLd
expect  that  as the  publicrs  forecasUs lnprove  t,he nonetary  authority  would
uanl  fo  confuse_the public  by having worse mone|ary control  .  However, it,
seerns Lhag in  our  anaLysi.s  as  the  public  gets  bet,t.er fonecasts  of  the
policynaker's  pnefenence shocks they  pl-ace  more welgh!  on their  preferencd'
shock est,lnates  and less  on realizat_ions  of  past  money  gnowth.  Therefore,
the monetapy  authorlty  cannot  effecLively  offset  the  publlcrs  improved
forecasts  by increasing  the  contnoL varlance;  the  public  pays ]ess  aLtent,ionto
to  rnoney  SrowLh.  So ln  order  to  contlnue  go lnfluence  the  publ"lcrs
expecfations,  the  monetary authoniiy  has incentive  Uo impnove  nonet,ary
control  and  prevenl  lhe  weight,s  pLaced on rea]1zallons  of  noney  growth  fron
fall  ing.
While  the  nonetary  aulhorlty  is  less  likety  to  use positive  conLrol
variance  to  offset  an increase  tn  Lhe quality  of  the  publlcrs  preference
shock  esllmat,e,  the  monetary  authorlty  may use  other  neans  to  obscwe  it,s
preferences.  As we indicated  above,  anything  that  j.ncreases the  publicrs
narginal  cost  of  obLaining  a  preference  shock estimate  causes o:  to
increase.  Thenefone, the  noneLary authorily  can improve its  welfare  by
naking  it,  coscly  for  the  public  to  dlscern  lhe  nonetary  auihonllyrs  lrue
pneferences.  The Federal  Reservers  penchant  for  secrecy  could  be rdot,ivated
by a  desire  No palse  the  cosls  to  the  p{rblic  of  dlscovering  lhe  Fedrs true
preferences.  Furlhennore,  Proposltion  3 implies  that  secrecy may  pesulL  in
the  choice  of  institutions  lhal  resuMn  hiaher  contnol  vaniance.
SecLion 4:  Conclusion
Thls  paper  extends  the  asymmetnlc  lnformation  model  of  Cuklernan  and
Meltzer  (1986) by al,lowing agents  to  rraugmenLr  thetr  i.nfornat,lon se!.  By
devoting  resources  to  rrFed  watchingrt agents  form  a rat,lonal- expectallon  of
Lhe moneNary  aulhorj.tyrs  preferenceg  based not  only  upon pas!  obsenvaLiong
of  rnoney growlh  but  also  upon current  and  past  estlmates  of  the
conternpor  aneous policyrnaker  preference  shocks.  The quality  of  the
preference  shock estj.naie  depends  upon the  amount.of resources  expended.
SeveraL  resulLs  stern frorn  lhe  lntroduction  of  augnenLed informallon
into  the  C-M  mode]  .17
(1)  The dist,ribution
endogenous --  ic
noney growth forecast  errors  is
chosen by the  public  when they choose the
of
anount of  resoupces to  devote No monitoning  Che Fedrs pneference
shocks.  Agent,s weigh  the  cosLg  of  an  inpFoved  preference  shock
esginate  againsb  improvement in  their  money  growth estinate.
Improvemenls  1n the  publ1c?s  estinates  of  the  rlpcfcrenl1p
shocks lowers  the  expected ubility  of  the  moneiaFy  authority.
Furlhenmore, fixed  rules  such as mf = 0 become  more aLtractj.ve  to
bhe monetary aulhority.
The publicrs  augmented  inforrnalion  set  nakes it  less  l j.kelv
that  the  nonetary  auihority  would choose institutions  that
lead  t,o positlve  cont,rot  variance.  In  C-M lhe  difference
bet,ween  actual  and pLanned money growt,h masks the  pneference
shock from  the  Etblic,  However,  when agents have their  own
lndependent estinates  of  Lhe policymaker's  preference  shocks,
the  abj.lit,y  of  lhe  controt  error  to  obscure  policymaken
preferences  is  dlmlnlshed.
In  C-M, credibility  depends upon ho!, quj.ckly the  publ_ic learns.  This
depends ln  lurn  upon the  informatlon  conLent of  money  supply  observations.
The monetary  authority  can  lessen  the  lnformation  content  of  noney supply
observatlons  by having  poor moneiary contro].  In  our  modeL, t.he speed of
learnlng  depends upon the  publj.c's  acquisition  of  lnfornation.  Agents by
invesling  in  informatlon  diminish  the  policymaker,s  incentlve  for  nolsy
monetary control  .  Policymakers can lower  monltoning  activity  by Lhe public
by increaslng  Lhe cost  of  acquiring  infornati.on.  Perhaps the  Fedrs desire
for  secrecy,  see coodfrlend  [1986],  can be rationallzed  as an atlempt, to
increase  the  cost  of  acqulring  lnfornalion.
(2)
(3)18
Several  extenslons  of  the  above model  could  be considered,  We di.d not
take  int,o  account  informational  differences  beLween agenLs.  How  does  the
modeL change when only  a  subset  of  agenls  has  superior  informatlon?
Fu"thermore,  lf  there  ls  a nechanism (i,e.  the  market,  see Grossman  and
Stiglitz  t19801)  t,hat resul!s  in  private  information  being  dispersed  anong
ghe entire  pubLic,  then lhere  nay be severe free  rider  effecls  wlt,h regards
to  expending  Fesources  !o  uncover  policymaker  preferences,  Examinlng  lhe
nole  of  differential.  lnfornaiion  among  the  Elblic  and posslble  free  rlder
problens  coul-d be enl i ghtening .
Finally,  in  C-M the rnonetary  authorlt,y,s  preferences  and the  shocks to
these  preferences  are,  presunably,  being driven  by social  and economic
forces  that  are not  explicitly  modell-ed,  In our  model,  the  public's
understanding  of  these  forces  are  assurned  go  be srlnmarized  by  their  curren!
and past  estimales  of  the monetary authopityrs  pneference shocks.  Further
work in  trylng  to  ideniify  and nodel  the  interaction  of  t,hese soclo/economlc
forces  and including  agents  who have an  lnp€rfect  undeFslandj.ng of  these
forces  is  needed.
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FOOTNOTES
1,  The aut,hors  Hish  to  thank  Gerald  Dwyer and Ne1l  Baymon  for  hetpful
comment's  on  an earlier  draft.  The vlews  expnessed  are  lhe  aulhops,  and
do noc necessat"ily Feflect  those of  the  Federal  Reserve Bank of  Dallas.
2.  Here lhe  term  quallly  refers  lo  lhe  variance  of  the  cu.rent  period
foreca.st  error.
3.  rnprici!]y  we a.re assuming that, the  2 parameler fariily  of  distributlong
descrlbes  v- ,  or  that  the  other  monents of  the  dlstributlon  are
wlchanged .
4.  This  assunpt,ion  maintains  the  information  asymnetny  belween  lhe
monetary authorlty  and the  publlc,  nob between indlvidual.s.
Furthermore,  the  ,niform  infornation  seL across  agents  implies  there  ie
no  rrfree  riderrr  probLem whereby  rtusedfi informat,ion  becoines  a  Dublic
good in  the  acqlisillon  of  infopnaLion.
5.  The underlying  assumption  is  that  t,he variance  of  t,he forecast  error  19
a monotonica]ly  decreasing  function  with  respect  to  agentrs  resource
u
expenditure.  0r,  o"-  = f (F), wiLh f'  < 0, where R is  the agentrs
reSource expendlture.  Clear]y,  R is  the  true  choice  vapiabl.e.  In
onder to  nininize  nolation,  we have chosen No substitute  oi  as  fne
choice  var  j.able  in  the  agenc's  objectlve  function,  i.e,  R =
-1  2  t
f  (ol) - c(ol).?o
7.
6.  Notlce that  Lhe second  order condiri.ons  hold,  i.e.,  -C[(ol)  < O.
The pananeters BO  and B are  taken  as given,
The publicts  "optimal,'  choj.ce of  a constant  ol,  r.rnicn  satlsfleg
equat,ion (23),  is  not  time  consislent.  Accordlng Co Lhe decislon  rule
prescribed  by lhe  first-order  condlllon  represented  by equation  (23),
agents  are  committed  to  choosj.ng the  constant  forecast  error  variance
for  pepiods  1+  i  (j  :'1 ).  Tj.ne inconsistency  arises  because  the
curren0  vafue  of  o!  affects  future  noney  growch  fonecast  error.  Ihis
dependence  is  obvlous  from equation  (A6) in  the  Appendix.  In  addltton,
changes 1n current  period  o2 affect  future  money  growth forecast  errors
througb  changes in  cne 
"e:.g;ts 
placed  on  cur.rent  preference  shock
estimates (i.e.,  fhe a.rs  and br's  in  equations (A7) and (A8)).
JJ
If  agents  t,ake th€  reactian  function  of  the  monetary authoriiy  as
constan!  (1.e,,  AO  and B are  constant)  then the  Lime consistenL  choice
)
of  ol  . , .  (j  :  0) will  saLisfy
-  B-l(1-BI-)  -  c'(ol  ,)  = 0  i  = 0,  1
(For an anatytical  a""iu^tfon=of  the  opti.mal  ,  time  consis|ent  ol,  s."
sect,ion  5 of  the  appendlx.)
Ther  e nay  be other  eqlj.Iibria  whene o^2  .  is  not  constant.
10.  Expected utility  of  the  monelary aulhority  in  Cukierrnan  and MelLzen ls:
9.
1
i"; r-F I u"i "30' ,'"1  1
L  Gr7  - --T - 
i;V)J21
11.  Expected utility  fop  Lhe nonetary  aulhopity  under the  fixed  ru.Le is
2
o"
12.  The flrst  order  conditlons  ln  Cuklepman  and Mellzerrs  nodel  are:
r-  2  -2  .-  -dB
r  I oe  ou'  pBou'  _  dBo  .e  Bil  z 
-l 
or
T=F  L  oT  n:rtt  - 
.'*T 
- Ho  o-T-  " 
- 
1,-ozt  ""  J G22
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Appendices
1. Derj.vation  of Etpil  rr_.1  , ri_2, ..., 
"?,ul_r, 
u!_r, ..,:
Let yi  = rn1  -  B0A.
The information set  consisLs  of  obsenvations  of  Xf_t,  y 
f_2, 
...  ano vl,  ver_r,
ui-r,  ...,  and loowledee  of  of,  Bo, B, A, ouz,  ..,d the propertj.es  of  the
preference shock estimates.  These  properDies  are:
Et(v.  .- u!  .ll  = o. Ef  (v  -,,€  t?t = ^2 -'  i-i  1-i'-  -'  ""'i-i  'i-i/  J - 
"",l-j'
E[v.-. (vi-j- u!_,  l: = o3,r_:,  etver_  (vi_.1-  u"1_r)t  =  o,
and  E[v.-.  (u.-,.- v?.  ,-ll = o for jrk.  Agent,s  wirr use  this  lnformation  se! ]-J  l-K  rFk'-
efflcj.entty !o minimize  Et  (p.  - E(pt  1 r  I  l2l,
Let,
6V
(A1  )  Eto,l  r,l =  r 
". ti  *  r  b, u?_.
i=t  j=0  'i  f  J
The lri.ck  is  to  choose rhe  paramet,ers  a.  and b.  to  minimize  o  t t  n  ,-r 




,  ,) (A2)  rt(p.-e  (prlrr))'1 - elpi- .r, ,,,0,_, - t')  -  r  u.u?-,12 -  j=1  j=0  J  .  J
w-
flat  nt  r  ^J-  v  'i-i 
e  2 \'r./  EL.r_  pui_i-  ,  a.(  X,  p-v._._u  * -il)  -  E  b.v]_.,J'.
j=0  J=1 
,  r<=0  rJr\  "  j=o  J  ]-J
Rewri ti.ng  (13),  we get
.  e.  -,  c  2 (A4)  E[(v.-  oovl)+[(o-a.,  ) u  r_.t br u]_rl*[(p'- pa.,-  ar)v _a-  u, v!_rJ
* t(p'- p-a1-  paa- 
"3)ur_3- 
urv!_rJ  +...
o  Y.  ^
Ft L  a.----=  I  -
j=1
Furt,her newriNing  ylelds
(A5)  Et(1-bo)v.+  uo(v  -vl)  * (p-a.,-br)v._1*  b1(vi_t-  v?_1),  (pz-a.p -  a^-  b^)v.  ^ + b^(v.  ^- u9 ^l
I  zlL-1  I  I-Z  I-Z
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By Laking expectations  of  (45)  and uslng  lhe  propepLies of  v?_.,  we get
,-  -,2-  2  2  2 2  2 (Ab) EL(p.- ELpllIil)-l  = (1-bo)-  oi  * bio"-,,  + 2(  1-b0)booe-,i
+ (p-a1-b1)2ol  * o2,o2",...1  * 2(p-a.,-br)bro"2,i-r
* (p2- p"r- a;  a)zof, '  b22o2",r-2  * z(p2-  oa:  or)$raz,i-z t  "'
2
"*i).
i-'l  J  o-
J-'
Choose  a.,  b.  to  minimize (A6).  The  first  onder conditj.ons for  Che  b,'s  ape
JJJ
.2  2 (A7a)  -  2(1-b^)o-- + 2(  1-b^)ol  . = 0 u  v  u  e,I
?2
(A7b)  -  2(o-a.-b.)  o- + 2(o-a--b-)o-  -=0
I  I  V  !  I  e,I-t
2222 (A7c) - 2(p--pa,-a^-O^)  sl  + l(p'-pa^-a^-b^)ol ,  --o IIMZZe,!-Z
Si.nce  oj,o  s of  Vk, lhen rhe FOC  irnply  that  oo = 
1, 
b1 = p-al , V, = ,t-:o^r-
ar, b,  = ,3- r2^,- rur-^1, etc,  The  first  order conditions with respect to lhe
aJrs are:lo
(A8a)  atp-a.,-u.,Jof  - roro3,r_r  - zpLpz-pa.,-ar-o;  of,
2  2  ?  2  )  ^2.  z -2pb 
zo 
",i-z 




+?e  -:  =0 --1  2
(  A8b  )  -zl  p2  - pa,-  a  1o )ozu 
- ro roZ,  r_, 
-z  pl  p3  -  p2  a,-  oa  r-  a  lr  rlof,-  2  pbe,  i_3
2 o,,,
+ zaz  i  = o
-B-
(  A8c  )  -zl  p3  -p2  ^  r-  p^r-a, urJof -ro 
lo3,  r_z 
-zpI  p  4 -p3. 
1 
-o2rr-oar-au-ouJof
-t00 ,,a ,l e, t-q
2
+  2a  ----:  =  n
Using the FOC!s  for  t,he  b.rs,  we can rewrite  (A8a), (A8b)r...3s
(  A9a  )  -at  p  -r.,  I  o  j, r_  r-?  pl  p2  -p  a,-a  rl  of,  ,  r_.-zpzt  p3  -  o'  ^,-  r^  r-  ^  rJ  o3,  r_,
^.2  -2  ?  2  2  -2-U  7  2  _2 (A9b)  -2Lp -0a.,-arJo-,i_z 2plp-- p-a1-paz  -a 
rJo-,  t_3-2p-[p 
-0'a.,-p-ar-0ar-a,',Jo!,i_l
. ,^6^  =  o.
D
If  o",,*  = o!_f.,  then equat.ions (A9a),  (Agb)  exactly  the  sane as
equaiion  (A4) in  c-M excep!  ti,"a  of  is  neplaced by o2,  Therefone, we can
use thei.r  solution  for  the  a.'s.  C-M find  that
(41o)  a.  = (p-l)ri-1
1
where  ),  =  ;,+.  ,r -(frf.-  o)'-,)Eg
and r=-t'.
ov
Using (A10) and t,he flrst  order  conditions  for  the  b.'s,  we find  tha!
(A1  1)  u. = rj.
J
ThePefore,
I ^-I  \ (A12) Etp.lr.l  = \q1/  E  tJv. -  *  r  rJv? r'  r  o  j=o 
- 1-  r-J  j=o  l-J
Using (A1  2),  and lhe fac!  tha!  y.  = m. -  BOA,  we find  that
(  P-)'  )  B^A
(15)  Etpilril =  -dA=#  + (p:^r 
,t=o 
^' rr_''-;  . 
,10 
^'ui-r.
2.  Proof  of  Proposition  l
The polj.cymakers  probfem  is  to
- max  f-  :r  (r. )2r'l
(A1rr)  'i;,.'.  .l  i  et(r*--  E(m.lr-)lx.  -  ---)  | . r,r=v 
Li=o  \  r  -L r  L  z  /J
Rewrtt.lng (  41  4)
- max  f-  if^  f1-n\ (A15)'l-,=n,...  el  r  er(mf  *,ri - f,El+  BoA  - (p-r)  r tJ(ml_r_1+
I  r-^ b r-v  j=0
vr-,-1)xr-  e.i^  riu!-.t*,  - t'i 
; 
*"t)].
r  J  '  ' 
i=0
The flrst  order  conditions  imply
3e(v?.x. .)  aE(v?  ^x. ^)
(A1  6)  xi-(p-r)[BE(xr*r)*u  --f#a  *BtiE(x 
i*2)+Bz 
- 
"+- a.i  EmT
.^r, 0t(ui*',*r*r)  ^3.2-,  ,.-3  aE(ui*:*i*3)  .^3.  3E(u!*2*i*a)
-u-^ 
4 
*9"'l-E(xi*3)*''  --d._.:  .u"^ 
T!
^-,  e
^3.2  aE(v;+1x  )
+E^  * 









1S conslanl  over  time  then  --.r----J-
dIn'-
I
= 0.  Also n(V.)  = O.  Therefore
can be writlen  as
x. -  (p-r)tBE(x,.,;  * B2l n(r,,^;  * g3l2n(x,,.) *'  .
r  l+ I  I+z  I+J
is  the  same  first  order  condition  as in  C-M; lherefore,
resulls  to  obtain
r?  = e^n + BD.. where






(A1q\  R  = 
,L'P -0  1-Br.'
(A20)  B  =
3.  Derivatj.on  of  Equation  (21  ).
Becall  that,
(A21  )  E[mi  lIi]  = BoA  + BE[pi  l]il,
Using (A21) and equatlon (j3)
(M?)  E[(mr-  EImrlrr])2j = Et82(pi  - utnrlrij)21 - o;.
SubsLj.t.uting  (41  2) in for E[nrlrr] in equation  (A22),  we  ger
?  - 
- 
i  Yt-.-t  @  i  6  ) (A23)  uzrlpi  (p-r).r^rJ  i rJ u!_''i'- ofi. -  j=0  l=0
This  in  turn  can be written  as
@!,
i  'i-i-l 
i  e  .2  2 (Mr'l) B-E[pi  - (o-r) 
.ro.lJ[nr_j_t 
. --d-  J -.1olJvi_r]"  * oi.
J_V  J-
,::::""":::";"1*  ""]*'  *,_j_r.  r  i "  _2 2 (M5)  szsl  .r^oiv1_1-  (p-r).E^rit,.E  (o  kvr_.,_r_u)*  -j-l  - r rJv?_,1.*  o*.
i=0  j=0  k=0  -  j=0  I  J
Rewrit,ing (A25),  we get  after  sorne  afgebra
v
(A26)  sznl  r rr(u  - ui_i)  - (p-^)r^ri +:1]2.  o2v.
j=0  r'-J  r-J  j=0  B29
Taking expeclations,
^f  -  ^. ^  -.  o2-'l
(laT)  Bt  I  t  xzi  ol * (  p-r)2 t  ,ti  4  l- ot-.
Lj=o  =  j=o  B'J
Thi  c  imhl  laa  th.t-
^22
(A28)  Et(n.-E(miiril  )'l  = " oZ 
*  -CrI'o3 * o3.
1-  \t  r-^t  Y  Y
4.  The  opt,inal  constant  o2.  (DerivaLion  of  Equation  23),
The publlcrs  problen  is  to
t:*  (  ^  o'  ..a  ^  ^  ^) (Ms)  '3  -,*,t" 
;i 
- @,_poi  . of  . ",'3j
TakinS  derlvat,ive of  (A29)  Hith respect to  o! vtetos.
dB
,l
+ c'( o-) ) = 0,
-l
Algebna yields  )
dB
(A30),J'  ti#  .  * .l'i14,,-*  .'++r_  "i-'##';]  fr
"u 
"^'  o1  Rz  f  ,  ,)(1_ro)  {l  f-l  ,r: = (A31)  ,+-t-*#  . 
# 
.l^"!-to-' 
r.J  \oo!/  r,-^.F-
.\
^l
* c' (  o^')  |  -  0. --l
J
From the  equaLion  (A9a) anO the  forrn of  the  panameters a.,  we find  that
J
2
-2\  2  0,
---:-:  d-  + 2(n-I)  j  =  O.  This  innliFs  that  thp  first  opder  condition  for 1.-n )  -o  )  "'
maximization  problem (A29) is30
I
^l





lZtsdo  a  _2
(A32) -{  u="  *  '
I  r-rt  r-r2
2
o 5.  Derivatlon  of  the  time  consistent  opii.mal
The publj.crs  problem is  to
'1*  (-  rr (A33)  '3.,  -,1  t st  {.1frr  rr,n,ltr(o3,,,  o
L1=o  L L
Reurlting (A33),  we  get
nax  f-  ??
(A3rr)  ;?.  l ; 
"{;[-'" 
i]
t'=o L Lr-(P 
- Eteilrll)l
Using equation  (46)  and remembering that  the
fr  -E(m.rr.r\].|""  ,n  u
"no""n ::.:tnimize 
r[_lm  ' 
,,  , ,/  J max  r-  :  -
(A35)  ot .-J  r  *1,l  rt | fi-oo,.  ttof - o'o,io
""[=o  L  L
3,,-,""r:)'
oi  I are
*(p-a1,1  u',,.  )2of  * o1-ro3,r-''.  z(p-ar,i
2 + 2(1-b^ .)b^ .o- U,r  u,1 e,1
2 -  D"  .to.  .o r,1  I,I  etL-l
*(p2-p".!,t-r2,i-br,i)2  t', ,o2,r"3,or,  z(p?-par,t-"2,i-b2,i)b  ,,,  o3,r_,
ing  t.hai  BO and
-l
" 





"col  .)) l
",,  )  )
ameters  ,j,i  -d
dix  'l 
,  we get
\
2  ) 
'\l
o-*  * c(sl  . )'  '  .
r  sr-L  |  | rl
2J
to  o-  nememben
?1




the  den-ivative of  (A35) with  nespect
taken as given,  we get
. ^r - -  Bie2  loto,, 











*a2  i eo' 




-  aEtpk-_E(pklrk)  l2  abJ,k
k=1 j=t  ouj,u  Bo"t,i 
- 
r.=i-  jlo  aoj,o  n"3,,JI
*  Bi c'(02  .)  = o.
Recau  that  for  the  case 
2  2
where o-,.  = ol,  for  all  i,  b.,t 
"nd.j,i 
are Biven
by equations (A1  0) and (A1  1).  Al-so,  sj.nce 
"j,i 
-O  br,,  are ehosen
aEt  p,.-  e  (p,.lr,-)  I2
opti.aally  (see  Appendix  l ),  --\:-.-.-:---:-  = 0 and
""i,x
Therefore,  we can rewpiLe  (A36) as
.(  ^
(A37)  -  ei{  n2tr*612 *  g214  *  g3t6 '.  '  .l  + c,(o
\
Thus, the  tine  consistenb  opt,imal ou'  will  satisfy
2
2 (A38)  +  c'( o:) = o.
1-Bl-






6. Proof of  Proposition 2.
Let, FoC  be f1rst,  order  conditi.on
second order  conditions  for  t,he
glven  by equation  (A31  ).  Let  SoC  be the




































zB2 f,  ar
rr7r2  L%  ;4
(p-r(r-rp)l - ---;2-J
Lhe relalion  beLween
IP  (P-r  ) *
o^  |
7z\
do  | .
22
o  ^ ano o,,,
(1-rp)l
2








Using in  tenms B and  l,?
aB  -aB  o" 
a  ), --=  -- 
-
aoi  =  3ot  ot  and  n-2
Y  e  e  dov








,3]  .  ,H,,,  ,?  ['":  ,t
^  2\
zz  ,  ,'!P'  - 
ou, 





















--l  + )
D
2
2),o-  = 2(1-pI) (p-l)
Reaffanging  (A40),
AB (^z
.  I d0.,.
(A41)  ,#,1-..  ,
L'-^
?B?  at
22  2 (1-r-)- aoi
B
where  r  =
(A42)  l'(r)
trR









and  l(r )
/1  1+n  r  t-  1
r(r ){  ;('  *  o)--1 )  2
2p
use  bhe equalion  I




(1-Bpr  -  gpl'zzz  j  loa = - gpl'e3
-..  ov




*  P  /t  ,t*"
.2  \4  p
we
2












/  1  , f+r
|  :-  +  (-  +
\^  p
If  one writes  out
Lhat  this  term  is
look  at  the  second
I  22  2
/-B  o  2Bo o^  ..1  e  +  e -2  =  n  l.T  --r








-  -e -TA)"
Y
26













aB  1  al' r  au  l-.  e ae  I -4  -fi-'  ;i;  *:  L'  ' u;4J
Finafly,
2r^2
toqr)  9-t - = at. a?  llq - a=g  ?t^
aofi  a"!  ao!  o[  "L  "  ,of,
SubstiLutlng equat,ion  (A45) into  (A41  )
AB
.  I oi,, t- (A46)  - ,+.,{  -Y 
" l+a  * ro}  o2  * 'z
( r-F,ll,  1_rl\  | o \e iii  F":  *:  .{
2(1-lo)  2 dI r  --;-T  0.,.  -^





t  {  "v  l,- -rr-el 
[,,,_^2,L"'-
2




, r^2 3!  lo * r^2 E  | - -"e ^ 21"  -"e ^ 2l^
do^ L  d0^  |
t  [-!er  .^zaB -+
2  |  ?  .--a  )





^)r1 /1+r  . ^r2-r.,-) ll P/
the  Lern  fuu  - ,  , *r:!^  - rr'"3"  1*)'l
L  aou'  "  "  \ao"'/ J
atways  positive.  Tl:Ils, Lo sign equacion  (All
tern  in  (A47).  The  second  term can be writ
lJ  we
ten  as(A4s)  +  1  ;
Ds'-  (  t  -r')
*ol'-rl-t'1













E  ol 2x







a!  the  term
|  ,1  +r
I"
*[i  *  P
\^
Ce this  term
""31 jt'





can wrlte  (A50) as
ft,-u^r-rt,5)
,1+r
p p)2-r  )
2" (1-t-)  + r-B-B











Uslng  (A43),  we
,._.2
(  A51  )
(1-r-)r
negative .  Con".q.r"ntly,  qE$]
^2 oov
ao2*
< O  whlch implies g53g  --3  a n
ao?,,




(A52)  1-ero  > s8t -9 '2
ov




It  ls  possible  for  (A52) not  hold  and equation  (A51) stilf  be poeitlve.
ao2
Furt,hermore, it  may be possible  for  j  Lo be negative  even if  equation
ooY
(A51  )  1s not  positive  slnce  euqation  (A48) may stil-l  be posit,ive.  Finally,
even if  equation  (A48)  1s negative  lt  sti]l  may be possible  for  (A47) to  be
ao2*
negati.ve and, consequently,  -  < O.  Thus, condition  (A52) represents  a
aoi
sufficient  condi  t ion.
7.  Derj.vation  of  Monetary authoriLy  expected utiliLy.
The monetary expecled utllity  is





etriltr:  r,  - 
,  J
-  'l  l-  (B,.'A  * BP' * v' )2'l
(A54) = 
.t- B'E lB(pi-  elnrlrrJ (A+pi)  -  --- 
?-!----  | i=oL'J
(A55) =;  u'u[u(i  o'u,-'-(p-r)  ,  ^'[,  k  vi-i-r']
ilo--g\1=o'  j=0  g=oo 
ut-5-t-!  -----J
(A56)  =,i.  rf 
[r(ri, 
^',",-:  -'i-i)-  ro-^r  !o  ^i  Yi-i-r) 
(ri.,'",-.,  )]
2  )  2\ too  u-ou 
"; I --Z'-172.- 
T)
1\ t_p  )
(A57)  = 
,io  u't ri 
^'r'  E[(ui-i  -  ui-r)ur-:,  - '# -#r,  ]l
(BOA  + B .r^  Oi  rr_.,  * Vf  )21
-  r  riu?-)/l  'i"  r  j=o  'J  '-l
i=o  ' ,/ \i.o 




z(t  -pz  )
)










8.  Proof  of  proposj.tlon  3,
z(l-p?)
by equation  (26)  and thar  SOC
2


















/ ^61  \  Y
2
0o-
RecalL that  the
AB








Noti  ce that  sz
3s-
,  bl  aB
^  Po;  ao?-.  ao?
















al  2o-a- ^2  a),
^2  -  "'v  ^2
oJ  -  -.-.--.----  o0




^  dg-.dg  ^  d0 )\ue2ut




2  -  -o  ?
v  ^  <^  z













aB -v  a-B




d  o...  a
YC
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'v  1 -:-  +  -:-
a  t-6
d















Therefore, aF0c > 0. 2
dc